Category Security

One can not put anything beyond the Ugandan Police!


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I thought Kayihura has all the guns, money and the support of the Appointing Authority. I thought this would be the time to clear his name and clean the image of the police. Although I was disappointed with the way things turned out, I was not surprised. One can not put anything beyond the Ugandan Police. Officer Baguma’s saga tells it all. In the past it was unthinkable that the Police force would do anything to shield somebody suspected of facilitating a murder or being negligent of his duty from prosecution. One wonders why he opted to use the goons or allow the goons invade the court. Anyway he is on record to have applauded the goons and the criminals in the police force he heads for beating up the helpless citizens.

Populist approaches to purely legal matters may not be of any benefit any one. One can never know when the very populist approach will work against such a person. It is a dangerous approach this highly learned friend chose take knowing very well that everyone needs the law to accord him or her a fair hearing. A mob justice does not solve anything. When you allow goons and mobs to work with and even be part of the police force, then you know something has gone totally wrong.

Let us pray for him but most importantly for our country so that we don’t go down that path. We have been there before. And the experience was not a good one. During the Obote’s second regime it were the men in police uniform that would organize “panda gari” raids and send citizens to fields where they were screened, the unlucky ones tortured and others killed. The police force that was supposed to protect people and their lives in the first place was the very force organize for their disappearance and possible death. And after that they would claim to be protecting people and their property. Hope we are not about to witness history repeating its self.

My honest prayers for you all.

DR.IBRAHIM SENDAGILE
USA

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Amin Family Statement/Speech For Janan Luwum Memorial Day


His Excellency the President, ministers, government officials, members of the diplomatic community, the family of the late Archbishop Janan Luwum whom we remember today, Church leaders, the organizing committee, distinguished guests, fellow citizens, ladies and gentlemen.

On this day, we commemorate the first Janan Luwum day since government declared February 16th a national holiday last year.

As some might be aware, we the family of the late former president Alhajji Field Marshal Idi Amin Dada, had actually requested to the organizing committee that we be present at the memorial day function.

We are glad to have joined the rest of the country in this memorial for late former Archbishop of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Boga Zaire.
Even if it is happening 40 years later, it is important for the nation that we publicly reconcile and offer our condolences directly to the family of the late Archbishop Janan Luwum for the first time.

Our father remained silent on this matter until the end.
But we can tell you what we personally witnessed, and two incidents are central to our testimony.

First, on that fateful day 16th February 1977, we remember how our late father had just returned home to State House Kampala from the Nile Hotel meeting where the Archbishop had been publicly questioned about his involvement in armed rebellion.
Our late father then received a phone call informing him of some alarming news. He immediately drove out of the premises.
While we thought he had gone to attend to some distant emergency, a few minutes later we heard his voice again. He had actually just drove nearby to the neighboring government building.
So we went to the rear State House garden where we heard his big voice, and stood at the perimeter fence where we could see him arguing with some men outside the neighboring building below.

He was complaining that he had specifically ordered them to drive the Archbishop and the two ministers to their respective homes, then bring them back the next day for a private meeting with them. He was asking the men “What had happened?” and was furious that his last orders had not been followed.

The second event we witnessed had been about a week earlier. We had been driven to Rubaga cathedral, Kampala, where we found weapons displayed on the Church’s front lawn. We remember specifically seeing a blue truck with a false Pepsi logo that had been badly painted on its doors. The vehicle was parked next to the church.
Apparently the vehicle was being hidden there in broad daylight. The owners probably knew that security services might not suspect an empty lorry.
However the lorry had a false floor that made it look empty. And it is when the floor metal sheet was ripped open, that the weapons (Italian weapons according to the body guards) were discovered hidden beneath. As young children who were used to seeing the normal Uganda army weapons (during holidays we regularly did shooting practice plus dismounting, cleaning and remounting assault rifles) it was obvious that these were new and different. We hadn’t seen anything like them before.
The security men discussed how they had known that something was hidden at the church. But they had failed to find anything the first time they had gone to the check at the Archbishops residence. Only to discover later, and by chance, that the weapons were actually in the empty looking truck that had been parked there all along.

These are what we witnessed.
But since that day, the death of Archbishop Janan Luwum has brought grief to our late father as well, especially whenever the question arose at home.
One thing that is clear is that Amin didn’t order the Archbishops killing. On the contrary, he ordered his release.

But somebody killed the Archbishop either intentionally or was forced to. The story we heard is that he and the two ministers tried to over power the driver, one Moses Okello, so that they could then flee the country.
Only God knows the truth.

And contrary to what is usually said, Idi Amin was actually very respectful to the Church. The Archbishop had a very cordial relationship with him until that incident. Amin felt as if he had been stabbed in the back when he discovered what the Church was doing. It was shocking to him.

However it turned out later that it actually wasn’t the Church as an institution, but rebel loyalists within the Church who were preparing for armed rebellion to bring Obote back, and they had secretly used the institution. All those involved also turned out to be people fighting specifically for Obote’s cause on a sectarian/tribal basis.

In a recent Daily Monitor article, Mrs Mary Lawinyo Luwum the widow of the late Archbishop, recounted a meeting where our late father met the Archbishop a few days before his death. Amin asked a simple question: “Why was the Archbishop tarnishing his name to the western world using defamatory messages? The widow also says Amin then had a photo moment with the Archbishop to prove wrong the rumours circulating that the archbishop had been imprisoned. That was the Amin we know. Tough but always conciliatory. And this shows that right from the start, Idi Amin had no intention whatsoever of arresting the priest.
Today the rebels that the Archbishop was helping are mostly living in exile ever since their UNLA government was overthrown by the NRM on 25/01/1986.
If you hear how they talk about today’s Uganda, it is the same they were trying to do back then.

There were also high suspicions in the Amin regime that Moses Okello, the person who was last with the Archbishop and the two ministers, could have killed them intentionally.

However even the Amin government couldn’t prove it and thereby had to leave the matter where the available investigation findings concluded.

What the nation must understand is that the late Archbishop Japan Luwum’s story is one that had high political stakes for the so-called “Liberators”. The versions we read about clearly show serious disinformation at work in order to justify rebellion. They intentionally demonized our late father so that they could have a chance at ruling the country for themselves and not for the Ugandan people.
Events that happened between 1979 and 1986 prove this.
But by any standards, a truck full of weapons is a serious national security concern anywhere in the world. Today, any government would treat the Archbishop’s actions as terrorism. He wouldn’t even be invited for a chat with the president or a live interview, but might instead be immediately incarcerated in a maximum security prison comparable or worse than Guantanamo Bay.

What led to the famous public inquiry that was aired live on TV was Amin telling Ugandans and the international community to see for themselves what was going on. Transparency.
He wanted everyone to witness what had been prepared by Obote’s rebels.
At the time, our late father told Ugandans that all these weapons couldn’t be there to kill just him alone. And that it is the whole country that they were aiming at putting ablaze, and all Ugandans would suffer if they succeeded. Indeed that is what happened for a whole two decades from the day the Tanzanian forces and the Ugandan rebels marched together into the country.
Uganda Television should rebroadcast that live telecast so that todays Ugandans can see for themselves how the Archbishop pointed to Erinayo Oryema and Obote Ofumbi as his co-conspirators.

It is worth noting that prior to that, the two ministers hand’t even.been suspected in the matter and had actually come by themselves as respectable government ministers to the Nile Hotel meeting. All that changed only after they were pointed at by the Archbishop. This is in the recording.

Meanwhile in regards to our late father’s relation with the church, as president he had endeavored to treat the three major faiths equally as well. While there are claims that he had shared Indians properties with his friends and relatives, he actually didn’t have a single personal business his entire life.
Last year, we told the public how he had decreed that certain properties be given to the three major faiths: Old Kampala hilltop for Muslims, then Mapeera House land, Kampala road to the Catholic Church, and the new Church House premises, Kampala road, to the Anglican Church.

Maybe the two Churches can own up to Ugandans that Idi Amin initiated and encouraged these now beautiful towering developments in the center of Kampala?
Today, we want to help foster national healing. However it is something that is done in a reciprocal and/or multilateral way, and others also have an honesty role to play.
Today the nation can say let us never regress to the conflicts that existed, and where our country fought itself for more than four decades.
In that spirit, we would like to add our voice to the many who know that though there are still obvious challenges, we can also confirm that Uganda has largely progressed in terms of peace and stability, rule of law, economic development, democracy, and freedom of expression.

The people who purposely caused insecurity during Amin’s regime, and who have extensively confessed about their 8 year operations then, are here to celebrate the peace.

Today, we for example, have been voters since the first general elections under the 1995 constitution.
We lined up with everybody on that day in 1996 to choose Uganda’s leader. Our late father was glad that we had taken civic duties seriously.
So we salute progress as the best medicine for the country’s long term stability. It has made it possible for the Amin and Luwum families to live peacefully in the same country.

However, we call on all leaders, especially the younger generation that wasn’t actively present during the Archbishops days, or weren’t mature enough during the gruesome years that followed particularly from 1979 to 1986, to make sure that justice becomes an even bigger priority for this country.
Because we all know that justice, the rule of law and continuously rejecting impunity, is what will ultimately ensure that the country doesn’t regress to any future chaos.

For example, it was shocking for us to learn that concerning the death of the late Archbishop, even though some original video and documented records existed, none of the subsequent governments tried to organize a judicial inquiry or official forensic investigation. We wondered how can the state and the public rely on an individuals books as the official verdict yet there are designated government departments whose task is specifically to check crime?

Why hasn’t any government for example followed up Moses Okello, the last person with the Archbishop taking him home as ordered by our late father?
Also, why has one Mr. Lawoko made unscrupulous financial gain from the family’s grief? When he writes a book titled “Dungeons of Nakasero” claiming to be the last person to have seen the Archbishop alive inside a purported dungeon, also claiming that they were both incarcerated together, further alleging that Amin personally came and killed the Archbishop, yet that very day Mr. Lawoko was actually the head at Uganda Television/Radio Uganda, dispatching journalists to Nile Hotel and monitoring the live coverage.
We call that parasitic opportunism. Earning from other peoples grief.
Mr. Lawoko’s subordinate for example, veteran Radio Uganda journalist Mr. Charles Byekwaso, already publicly attested how he received his news assignments that very morning from his boss Mr. Lawoko himself at the national Radio station. We wonder has Lawoko at least made regular donations to Janan Luwum’s family from his unscrupulous earnings?

We for example, plan to make commemorative products with our late fathers picture and avail them to interested Ugandans soon. There has been huge interest for Amin memorabilia from the public.

We hereby pledge to make a donation from any earnings to the Archbishops family or community. Because we saw the sadness that his death caused to our late father. It is probably the one incident during his presidency that hurt him the most.
And it is because of that pain we saw on our late father’s face that we would also like to make the donation to a children’s charity since they are the country’s future. But we ask Mr. Lawoko to apologize to the family and the nation for his behavior.
But the important point as we look ahead is to always try and have justice served on any crime.
There also hasn’t been justice for Lubiri 1966 for example. Neither for Mukura, Luweero, Ombachi, Mbarara, and other probable serious mass crimes committed between the State and citizens by people whom most are alive and either living in Uganda or hiding abroad.

Yes, they have been increasing calls for a new independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission to review every major incident since independence.
We are surprised that criminals who unrepentantly massacred innocent peasants, have become national heroes, or are living comfortably in western countries. If one checks the names on the official list of national hero’s, one wonders if this is how they are supposed to pay for their crime in this country.
That is why there should also be the word “justice” in the Truth and Reconciliation commission’s title.

Just last week, Archbishop Desmond Tutu who headed the South African Truth Commission right after Apartheid, was expressing regret that dangerous criminals managed to walk scot-free to this day, yet the Commissions recommendations had been that punishment for serious crimes ought to be pursued by the South African government. The South African people are today questioning the relevance of that commission since Apartheid criminals are enjoying today’s multi-racial South Africa unpunished.

In that spirit, we would hereby like to make a humble request that the idea of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission be pursued vigorously to a just close for the bereaved and the country.
Also, that this important day February 16th be a day of remembrance for all who perished since independence.

This country has far so many unrecognized martyrs. People who died for the country. Some even didn’t know why they died.
We should remember them all together.
We sincerely hope that His Excellency President Yoweri Museveni, or whoever will be elected in two days, considers the matter for the sake of more peace, justice, political civility and long term stability.

Uganda today is a different place. Citizens are also called voters. This new generation of Ugandans are now choosing their own political destiny albeit with a few regrettable incidents during campaigns where we tend to regress to what looks exactly like the police state we have all heard about in the countries turbulent history.

But there has largely been tangible improvements. We once told our late father that he wouldn’t recognize Kampala with the development that the Ugandan people themselves have managed to achieve against all odds. We told him that here people say he opened their eyes.

The point is that we have long moved on together with the new generation in this country, and that is a good thing. We are therefore committed to always being with Ugandans as the country continues towards more economic growth and stability.
However it is justice that ultimately breaks the cycle of violence. We sincerely hope that the cycle hasn’t secretly grown and that another bout is possibly still coming ahead. Yesterdays incident where one citizen was shot by state agents as he supported his preferred candidate is highly regrettable and should be investigated until prosecution and punishment.

In that regard, and as we remember this country’s past, it is our constitutional duty to call upon the police and security services to cool down on national elective politics as they face civilians. As we said recently, our history should remind the state never to point guns at civilians whether during peace-keeping duty abroad or during elections at home. This is something we all need to consciously agree on as a country.

It is our constitutional duty as well to also request that the state puts in place greater guarantees that every citizen who so desires is always able to peacefully express their political views. That is another lesson from the widely circulated Archbishops legacy. Yes he took a decision against the sitting president. And that is important for any citizen to be able to continue to do peacefully.
It is days like today that should help us remember where the red line is in the actions of the state. Sadly, the Archbishop’s death was a red line that isn’t supposed to have happened.
And that is one way we can use his memory. As a guide to prevent mistakes from happening again.

We can achieve that with the memory of the late Archbishop in mind. I personally also have my own mothers memory, the late former first lady Kay Amin whose gruesome death on 14th August 1974 remains a motivating factor for me to advocate for peace and womens rights for example. Others might want to struggle for religious rights and increased political freedoms when they remember the fallen Ugandans.
In fact, one thing that could also help is that we include all the forgotten fallen Ugandans on this national day, so that as a nation we do some serious introspection to value each citizen regardless of political affiliation or the political impact of their rightful activities.

The just concluded presidential debate proved that increased political decency was just nearby yet Uganda hadn’t ever practiced it. We now realize that it brought added civility to the country’s politics. Anything that has the capacity to help us check our own political behaviors and help the citizens see political competition live with their own eyes so as to then choose from a level perspective, must be institutionalized so that we increasingly move beyond any personality cult and towards more institutionalization.

We therefore need to build on the present national consciousness that encourages constructive open debate. This might also be best served if the “Baraza” citizen’s debates are encouraged again rather than curbed as has been the case recently.
We might then be able to gain from each others ideas and thereby uplift the country’s common political consciousness.
It is a day like today where we need to remember the root causes that led to the numerous conflicts the country has experienced since independence day 9/10/1962.
The causes haven’t changed: Sectarianism, tribalism, nepotism, corruption and greed for power.
As we look at the new generation of youths living in a totally different time today compared to what the older generation has survived, it is our humble wish that the bright young men and women we see enjoying life to its fullest, including those struggling to get an education or looking for jobs, that they will live beyond war, abject poverty and darkness. Which wasn’t the case for some generations before them.
And finally, we also pray that the memory of all Ugandans who perished through the turbulent years be best served by today’s citizens gaining more peace, faith, quality education, improved health, freedom, individual rights, hard work, plus unity and reconciliation for all present and future.

For God And Our Country.

Hussein Lumumba Amin
Kampala, Uganda.

Date:16/02/2016

Tinyenfunza did real damage to Kony but both Muntu and M7 despise him


General Tinyefuza may have sympathy from some elements of the opposition, but surely it is crocodile tears.

There are some in FDC who hate Tinyefuza’s guts so badly. You remember when Tinyefuza was moving from one political party to another ‘mobilising’ them to remove the NRM after his return from UK?

General Muntu for one despises him and may not meet him. I promised to tell you the reason and here it is partly.

Many of those former senior officers did not like him. Vivian Asedri and I were the only journalists allowed by General Tinyefuza to cover the anti-Kony ‘operation North’ when it started in March 1991 but he also soon sent Asedri away to Kampala.

One day Tinyefuza, as Minister of State for Defence, summoned Army Commander Mugisha Muntu to Lira and made him to sit for three days in Lira Hotel, refusing to meet him, while telling us “these idiots don’t know what they are doing otherwise this war would have been over yesterday”.

Mugisha Muntu was lucky that Tinyefuza finally met him after three days. Brigadier Joram Mugume, the Chief of Combat Operations was made to sit for five days while Tinyefuza made little feasts at his residence where he would invite some local leaders and some of us.

He ordered Lt. Col. Reuben Ikondere, the Division Commander of NRA 5th Division to leave his house and ‘go to Kampala and when Ikondere delayed to leave, he asked soldiers to ‘bomb that house’. Ikondere was hearing on the walkie-talkie radio and fled the house in a huff!

This kind of humiliation became too much for some of the senior commanders. At a High Command Meeting in Entebbe they complained to the Commander-in-Chief who sacked Tineyfuza and made hims a presidential advisor on Defence. He sulked for sometime before demanding to leave the army, without success, until making up again with the leadership.

Tinyefuza’s insolence did not start yesterday. Some of us watched but dared not report it in the press. One day president Museveni sent a message inviting Tinyefuza as Minister of State for Defence to report to Entebbe State House for an important meeting. Tinyefuza would not directly read his messages however confidential and preferred that the signaler reads it out to him allowed, in presence of even civilians.

Guess what he said. “Tell him (the president) that I do not have a helicopter at my disposal now and would arrive at 5pm instead of 2pm”. Yet, there were three helicopters parked and fueled ready for take off.

I one evening told him that many people were not happy about the strong hand treatment meted out during the cordon and search operations and especially that some of the arrested 18 northern leaders were seen as innocent and he simply told me “Billie stop thinking like a kid. I did not expect them to applaud me or the government”.

On the other hand, despite being heavy handed, Tinyefuza’s operations weakened Kony quite a lot and Kony never recovered until he went to Sudan in 1994 and found new allies there.

Let’s watch the next chapter in the controversial life of this General.

By the way, that ruse he pulled of changing his name from Tinyefuza to ‘Sejusa’ three years ago is nothing really. When I went into his house on Acacia Avenue Kololo in 1991, currently occupied by the Kenya High Commission as offices, Tinyefuza had a stuffed leopard in his living room and on the wall was his law degree certificate in the name of ‘David Sejusa Munungu Tinyefuza”.

So what change was this? It is like a Lango man saying he is changing his name from ‘Ogwang’ to ‘Fox’. They mean the same.

Billie Kadameri via the UAH forum

STOP COOPERATING WITH THE POLICE SINCE THEY’RE ONLY FOR NRM AND MUSEVENI


BY MAYIMUNA NABAGEREKA

A police force should be protecting us but its not , and I dont know why Ugandans are still cooperating with on various issues.The Police cannot continue to lord it over the public if they are not perceived to work for them. The people’s reaction to stop cooperating with them is warranted: it may be extreme, but it will be a protest against government’s irresponsibility. Firefighters should also be chased from accident scenes when they arrive too late. For me, it will be refreshing to see Ugandans showing greater boldness in demanding their rights. As a nation, we are too timid.

How the Police view themselves is crucial. So, the change of paradigm from force to service is required. Is the idea that the Police organisation is not effective/efficient because of lack of resources valid? It is true that when you go to the Police stations you find them in varying states of dilapidation, if you go to ICT crime departments you find them with no working computers, etc., etc. But is this situation real or manufactured? Could the Police leadership do something about that if they wanted to?

KAYIHURA’S POLICE OFFICER ON UAH REACTS TO ARTICLE 79 OF THE CONSTITUTION


immaculate
‘I had earlier decided not to communicate on this forum but thanks to you for doubting the legal knowledge of my boss-you have forced me to come back. I realise it’s your knowledge of the Uganda laws that is lacking. You need to know that there are different laws in this country. Article 79 of the constitution is particular on one type of la-Acts of Parliament. There are statutory instruments which are laws not made by parliament but by a person or body authorised to do so under an Act of Parliament. For instance Ministers in government can make statutory instruments-these are laws!, KCCA has made bye-laws-these are laws!, Organisations also have laws in their respective constitutions and regulations governing both their operations and relationships between the members of the organisation. Thus the IGP’s remarks are not in anyway contrary to what Article 79 of the constitution provides. Party constitutions also have laws!. Interpreting 79 to mean that it covers all the laws is to display ignorance about the various laws applicable in a country.’—Musiimenta Immaculate.

“Political party constitutions [read NRM] are part of the body of law in this country” — IGP Gen. Kale Kayehura

VETTING THE UGANDA POLICE WONT HELP


BY ROBUKUI
Introduction
Last week a Police Constable Julius Mugambagye attached to Mbarara Police Station shot dead four people over a love affair. He was formerly a member of the Local Administration Police (LAP) that was dismantled and integrated into the Uganda Police Force (UPF). As usual immediately after this incident for fear that the it could spark off the much feared civil disobedience, the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Gen Kayihura rushed to the scene of crime. He addressed the residents and dished out cash handouts to the families of the deceased. In his ADDRESS, he expressed regrets over integration of former LAP into the UPF without adequate training. He promised that all police officers were to be subjected to fresh vetting to wipe out the undisciplined and unprofessional thus: “We can not tolerate this. All Police persons are to be subjected to fresh vetting to remove the undisciplined, those with criminal mind and character and the non patriotic.” He ordered that all former LAP personnel be taken for fresh training in Yumbe. He cited patriotism among the few benchmarks for one to be a Police Officer but fell short of disclosing that they were to undergo political indoctrination under the guise of fresh training.

Privatising the Uganda Police Force

When Museveni came to power in 1986 he inherited a Police force that was dominated by people hailing from the northern and north eastern regions though the force had a a good number of personnel hailing from the other regions. He viewed the entire force as being hostile to his regime the same way he it had been the case with the Judiciary and the entire legal fraternity. That way, the army took over policing with Gen Aronda’s team stationing itself at the Central Police Station (CPS). In the countryside, Civil Intelligence Officers (CIO) – the old version of the present District Internal Security Officers (DISO) took over running of police stations. His desperate efforts to recruit loyalist cadres into the police force around 1987 did not make any impact save for a few like Cadre Turyagumanawe. As time went on his conflict with the police escalated to the extent that he one time publicly told them that unless they learnt to vote wisely,their welfare would never improve.

He initiated the Julia Sebutinde commission in order to target and eliminate certain individuals in the Police force. He deployed Gen Katumba Wamala not to improve the force’s performance but to give way for ‘his own’ Gen Kaziini to rise to the position of Army Commander. At the time it was Gen Ivan Koreta and Gen Katumba Wamala who were most qualified to replace Gen JJ Odong as Army Commander. For the same purpose Gen Koreta was diverted to Internal Security Organisation (ISO). At the same time the rising star in the Police force, Inspector Fred was diverted to peace keeping in South Sudan. While at the helm of the Police, Gen Katumba Wamala was accused of mobilising logistics from City tycoons to facilitate community policing – a move Museveni described as “nonsense”. By the time both Gen Katumba and Gen Koreta returned to the mainstream military service, Gen Kaziini had raised to the position of army commander. The same way Gen Aronda had been assigned to the privatisation of the army scheme, Museveni appointed Gen Kayihura turn it into a coercive arm of his ruling NRM clique.

Intergrating LAP into UPF
As part of the wider privatisation scheme of the security forces, the traditional LAP was integrated into the UPF. The Uganda Police Force is provided for by Art 211 of the Constitution thus: “There shall be a police force to be known as the Uganda Police Force and such other police forces in Uganda as parliament may by law prescribe.” The LAP had been provided for under the Local Government Act Cap 243 S.179 thus: “Local Government Police and Prisons existing at the enactment of this Act shall CONTINUE in existence until a new law covering them is enacted.” The Police Act Cap 303 S.67 provided for LAP to be under the local government system but for matters of training and standardisation placed under the responsibility of the IGP. The Police (Amendment) Act 2006 amended the principal Police Act, S. 67 thus:

INTERPRETATION:
Police Authority means:-
(b) In relation to Local Administration Police, the administration of the area in which that force is
established.

S. 67A(1) A local Administration Police force existing immediately before the commencement of
this Act shall continue to exist in accordance with this Act and shall be fully integrated into the
Police Force as a Local Administration Police.

S. 67A(3) Local Administration Police shall be under the command and control of the IGP who
shall be responsible for all its operations.

S. 67A (4) The Local Administration Police shall:
(a) Receive the same training as officers of the Uganda Police Force.

S. 67A (5)
(b) Assist the local government in collection and safe keeping of money collected by
division councils.
(c) Work with Chiefs and Local Councils as may be required in the enforcement of law
and order.

S. 67A(6) Local Administration Police shall be appointed by the respective authorities under the
Act.

Going by the above, it is the IGP to blame for the alleged lack of training and professionalism by the former LAP personnel. However, the issue is not lack of training and professionalism but the erosion of discipline orchestrated by institutional impunity and protectionism. Just during the same time of the Mbarara incident, there was a similar incident in Jinja where the Police and the so called Crime Preventers OPENED fire to unarmed traders who had a scuffle with tax officials and injured two. The Police at the scene were under the command of the District Police Commander Apollo Kateba. In retaliation, the traders also descended on one of the crime preventers whom they almost lynched to death. The Regional Police Commander disclosed that two of his officers had been arrested for shooting people adding that they should have used their training to contain rioters. This phenomena of District Police Commanders leaving their stations to oversee small operations by their men alludes to the much feared civil disobedience. Its for the same reason that the other day the DPC of Old Kampala was involved in chasing the innocent journalist on the street before attempting to murder him. The Police Commanders are under briefing to be on the look out and not to take any incident for granted thus acting under pressure.

Its not only LAP that was integrated into the Uganda Police Force; all the different auxiliary forces that had been created in different parts of the country ended up in the Police force as Special Police Constables without going through the formal police recruitment and training. Currently the drive is targeting millions of NAZI GESTAPO like secret police in the form of Crime Preventers. As part of the reaction to the Mbarara shooting incident, plans were announced to recruit and train 23370 Crime Preventers throughout the district. But AGAIN how does a Local Administration Police personnel from Bunyaruguru end up serving in Kotido in Karamoja. The suspect Mugambagye Julius had just been transferred to Mbarara from Karamoja shortly before the incident.

Essence of vetting
Periodic vetting of Police officers would be a healthy move if it was done in good faith. In Kenya it is provided for in the constitution under Art. 246 and the S.7(2) and (3) of the National Police Service Act. It is carried out by the National Police Service Commission who invites the public to provide INFORMATION that may assist in determining the suitability and competence of officers. The overall objective is to build confidence and trust in the national Police service. The APPLICABLEvetting standards include officers satisfaction of entry and training requirements, their professional conduct and discipline, integrity financial probity, and respect for human rights. Those who satisfy the commission are retained and those whose integrity is found lacking are removed from the service. The last such vetting in Kenya was carried out in late 2013 through early 2014 when some heads rolled.

Therefore the vetting Kayihura is talking about is a purge to get rid of those suspected not to be fully loyal to Museveni’s life presidency project.

INFORMATION IS POWER.

Uganda is no doubt a police state .


POLICE
A police state : Is a state in which the government exercises rigid and repressive controls over the social, economic, and political life of the people, especially by means of both brutal presence of police and a secret police force.

The proposal by the NRM to have the data collected by the security for national identiy card to be used as voters register by the Electoral commission effectively means, Uganda is no doubt a police state .

The aim of police violence we see daily on the media is meant for oppression of the citizens,3 in 10 Ugandans are victims of police brutality, over time police brutality has become instruments of repression built up systematically and consciously by the dicatatorship for use against strikes, protests, demonstrations and other forms of social and political opposition to the dictates of governace.
To some persons who cannot see what’s happening to Uganda at the present time, it seems ridiculous to say that the Uganda is a police state,but with these deliberate criminal acts by the security is unquestionably signs of a modern police state!Uganda has indeed reached a crossroads. History may show that from this point forward, we will have left behind any semblance of constitutional government and entered into a militaristic state where all citizens are suspects and security trumps freedom. Certainly, this is a time when the regime operate off their own inscrutable, self-serving playbook with little in the way of checks and balances.
Ugandans must now wake up to the fact that this nation is now unquestionably a police state!
The Criminal Police State can now:
Avoid punishment for murder
Lay Seige in the city every time opposition wants to address a particular issue
Use the Police refer to any person with presidential interest as a terrorist
Spy on all citizens
Spy on and intimidate citizens
Brand anyone a terrorist
Ignore Human Rights entirely
Illegally imprison Ugandan citizens
Assassinate citizens
Loot taxpayer money for fat-cats

In a free society:
Police agencies respond only to evidence of planned and actual criminal activity.
Police officers keep the peace; they do not investigate citizens and activities unless there is some reason to investigate.
Police do not investigate citizens’ attitudes toward the central government, only their action.
Citizen dissent is lawful and police agencies do not investigate citizens’ attitudes toward the criminal justice apparatus.
Here are 10 indicators that Uganda is a police state.
1. Your leader has been president for several decades
2. Political activist are arrested and imprisoned after staging a political protest.
3. Your most famous activists are kidnapped.
4. When your leader is grooming his son to take over power from him.
5. When there is emerging class of overnight tycoons with unexplained source of wealth.
6. When all FM stations are owned by regime supporters and every negative news content attracts the attention of the state.
7. The state begins to legislate over laws to limit Internet access.State intends to run social media services .
8. When couples begin not to trust each other .
9. When the country consistently appears on the reports of human rights agency organisation for obviously doing the negatives.
10. When the state is very eager to push legislation that are draconian.

Its clear in black and white that first rule of the regime is to look out for itself, it is no longer the servant it has become the master. The president can stand boldly and say my army,my money,my oil etc

Moses Atocon Atyekwo

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS IN MUSEVENI’S NRA


POSTED BY ROBUKUI

Uganda follows the British model of military ranks and formations. The national army is supposed to be composed of the Infantry, the Air Force and the Marine.

INFANTRY RANKS
From bottom to top these ranks are: Recruit, Private (Pte), Lance Corporal (L/Cpl), Corporal (Cpl), Sergent (Sgt), Staff Sergent (S/Sgt), Warrant Officer class II (WO II), Warrant Officer class I (WO I), Cadet, Second Lieutenant (2LT), Lieutenant (Lt), Captain (Capt), Major (Maj), Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col), Colonel (Col), Brigadier (Brig), Major General (Maj. Gen.), Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.), General (Gen.).

OFFICERS AND MEN
Recruit is the title held during the first basic training to transform someone from civilian to a soldier thus becomes a Private upon successful completion of training. Cadet is the title given to someone who is undergoing training to become a Commissioned Officers and upon successful completion he becomes a 2Lt. From the rank of L/Cpl to WO I these are referred to as Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) while from 2lt to General they are referred to as Commissioned Officers. Generally all Non-commissioned Officers including Privates are referred to as ‘Men’ while the Commissioned Officers are referred to as ‘Officers’ thus the term ‘Officers and Men’. Among the officer ranks are Junior Officers (2lt – Capt) and Senior Officers (Major and above).

INFANTRY FORMATIONS
Basically the infantry is composed of riflemen or foot soldiers who are backed by support units like the armored, artillery, and Field Engineering. The smallest formation of an infantry unit is the Section (10 – 12 soldiers), the Platoon (three Sections), the Company or Coy (four Platoons), the Battalion or Bn (four companies), the Brigade or Bde (three or four Battalions) and the Division or Div (three or four Brigades).

COMMAND POSITIONS/RANKS
A Section is commanded by a Corporal who is referred to as a Section Commander and is assisted by the L/Cpl. A Platoon is Commanded by either a 2Lt or a Lt assisted by a Sgt and is referred to as a Platoon Commander and Platoon Sgt respectively. A company is commanded by either a Major or Capt and are often referred to as Officers Commanding or O.Cs. A Battalion is commanded by a Commanding Officer and often to as C.O. A Brigade is commanded by a Brigadier and is often referred to as a Brigade Commander. A Division is commanded by a General and is often referred to as Division Commander. Any Assistant to any of these positions is referred to as Second in Command (2i/c). A Brigadier is a 1st star General, a Major General is a 2 Star General, a Lt. Gen is a 3 Star General while a General is a 4 Star General. As you will note above, the higher the rank the further one gets away from direct enemy fire thus the saying “Wars are started by Politicians, planned by Generals and fought by Men”.

ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS/RANKS
There are administrative departments of the army that provide the logistical and administrative support to the forces at Company, Battalion, Brigade and Division level. These are linked to the army General Headquarters which seconds them to different formations to handle administrative tasks. These are Administration/Adjutant, Records, Finance/Pay, Intelligence, Medical, Supplies, Political Education/Commissars, Training and Operations, Transport etc. Such Officers hold ranks like S/Sgt, WOs, and Col. Warrant Officers are often referred to as Regimental Sergent Majors (RSMs) at Battalion level or Company Sergent Majors (CSM) at Company level. They are mainly concerned with assisting Commanders on matters of discipline of their Men. Literally, these positions are commonly referred to as Office positions since their holders don’t go to battle.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS
There is a set out procedure on how one qualifies to move from one rank to another and how to hold a position or an appointment. Promotions for Men is supposed to be proposed by their respective Unit Commanders and confirmed by the Promotions Board at the army headquarters. Promotion for Commissioned Officers is supposed to be proposed by the Promotions Board and confirmed by the Commander In Chief who is the President. This is called the Army Establishment which is supposed to clearly spell out the structures, recruitment, training, promotion, deployment, transfer and retirement of military personnel. Museveni has deliberately undermined the operation of army establishment for his personal interests.That is why the former armies like UNLA under Obote andUA under Amin did not have plenty of Generals and the total absence of the practice of rendering officers redundant (katebe).

SPECIALISED SUPPORT UNITS
Owing to their superior weapons, units like Mechanised, Armored, Artillery, Air Defense, Field Engineering etc provide the regular troops with the necessary superior fire support during combat. Sections of these units are simply attached to regular units but they retain their command link with their mother unit. It is these units that you see on major hill tops of Kampala city. It is these strategically powerful units that Museveni has placed under the command of his son.

HISTORICAL NRA RANKS
When Museveni took to the Bush he took with him both soldiers (UNLA/FRONASA, former Iddi Amin soldiers and some Policemen) and civilians. In the bush formal ranks for Officers were abandoned but instead they were replaced by informal rankings. These were Provisional Junior Officer II (PJOII), Junior Officer II (JOII), Junior Officer I (JOI), and Senior Officer (SO) that were equivalent to 2Lt, Lt, Capt, and Major and above respectively. For the Men or other ranks, the formal ranks of L/Cpl, Cpl, and Sgt remained but S/Sgt and WOs were banned.
Among the Senior Officers (SOs)were members of the High Command and of course Museveni’s rank was Chairman of the High Command (CHC). That is why during the early days of coming to power many were merely referred to as Commander so and so. At the time of capturing Kampala in 1986, the NRA had not more than ten Battalions some of which had composed what was referred to as Saleh’s Mobile Brigade. Even though, these Battalions were not of a full battalion strength. Some of the former UNLAs who had just joined the NRA with their formal ranks initially had problems fitting into the NRA command structure then. There was this reference to ‘original’ and ‘non original’ NRAs. The Twatera Embundu (came from the bush) and the Twaliire (joined after fall of Kampala).
As the NRA numerically expanded, it created three Brigades i.e 163rd Brigade for central and Western regions, 151 Brigade for eastern region and 167 Brigade for Northern and West Nile regions.
Because of corruption and patronage by end of late 80s most Men who had joined the NRA before capturing Kampala were holding the rank of Sgt. Commanders would reward their cooks, escorts, drivers, friends, concubines etc with the rank of Sgt. Some influential Senior Officers would even promote their own preferences to the officer ranks. With small money some individuals would EVEN buy ranks. This anomaly is partly to blame for the burning of the Republic House (Army Headquarters) in 1989.

INTRODUCTION OF FORMAL RANKS
When formal ranks were introduced Museveni landed the highest rank of Lt. Gen followed by Major Generals Tumwine, Saleh, and Rwigyema. Below them were Brigadiers Kanyankole, Tinyefuza , Kyaligonza and Kategaya (who was given a honorary Brigadier). By Officers service numbers, Kategaya is 002 after Museveni who is 001. Museveni deliberately awarded him a honorary rank in order to keep him away from the main stream military. Below them were the Colonels Chihandae, Cheif Ali, Lumumba, Otafiire, Mushega, Muntu and another Mugisha. Below came the Lt. Colonels like Dr. Besigye, Nasur Izaruk, Dr. Bata, Sserwanga Lwanga, Kashilingi, etc. Below them came the Majors who comprised of both officers who had been senior Officers (SOs) and those who had been Junior Officers at the fall of Kampala. Below them came the Captains like Aronda, Kayihura etc. Below them came the Lts and 2Lts. The rank of Major had the highest concentration of dissatisfaction as it was used as the dumping ground of those who had deserved more senior positions but because they had fallen victim to the internal bickering over positions they had to be punished i.e Italikire Kiiza who had been a Captain in the Amin Army, played a crucial role in training the NRA and became a Senior Officer in the bush but ended up being given a major with his juniors.
Generally, awarding of formal ranks was Museveni’s first step to personalise the NRA. Though the high ranks dis not match with the level of training it served its major purpose of neutralizing the ranks held by those who were joining the NRA from other armies e.g UNLA, UNRF, FUNA, UFM/FEDEMO, UPDA, the gratifying of the contribution made by different individuals while punishing the disobedient NRAs. The Baganda who had tirelessly fought in the Luwero war got a raw deal.

At the time (1987/88) the Twaliires likes of Katumba Wamala, JJ Odong, Otema, and others who had just joined NRA from UNLA were mere Lts. Angina and Tolit were 2nd Lts. Wilson Mbadi was a recruit in Kabamba while the late 1985 entrants like David Muhoozi, Bantariza, Mugira, Mayombo, Kyanda, Kayanja Muhanga, Tony Owana were Privates. Muhoozi the first son was in primary school.

PROMOTIONS UNDER FORMAL RANKS
Between 1988 -late 90s promotions in the NRA took the following forms:

1. Catching the attention of the Commander in Chief or upon recommendation of a God father Senior officer or politician. This is how most of the Western axis late 1985 entrants like Mugira, Mayombo, Bantariza, Rwakitarate, David Muhoozi and many others plus the bulk of and the now senior ISO Officers were commissioned as Lts without any Officer training or command exposure. Some remnants of of the bush war got elevation while some got stuck either on the same rank or none at all todate. In this way totally illiterate and semi illiterate officers were commissioned.

2. Cadet training – the first Officer Cadet training was conducted by the Tanzanians and attended by a bulk of late 1985 entrants and post take over candidates around 1987/88. The bulk of them them took up junior command and administrative positions from where they have since risen to very senior positions. During the proceeding years, Cadet courses continued to be conducted at Jinja producing quite a number of Officers. However, they have since been phased in favor of the current Muhoozi Officer Corps. Such officers are the likes of Col. Wakalo, Col. Emmy Mulindwa, Igumba and many others. The few luck ones like Dan Tizihwayo, Kayanja Muhanga, Stephene Kashure, and a few others continue to thrive while their other course mates lost out completely. At the beginning of the century the practice of recruiting civilians and taking them for Cadet training commenced. At one time, some cadet officers were put under the radar over suspicion that they had been infiltrated into the training by the then opposition Reform Agenda.

3. Those from other armies retained their ranks and a few progressed to senior ranks especially those who had junior ranks while many lost out. Over the years the rebel groups from West Nile and Northern Uganda had been abandoning rebellion and among the terms of surrender was the provision to retain their ranks. Museveni has handled this by not assigning them to command positions i.e UNRF’s Ali Bamuze and Group including Taban Amin, LRA’s Banya and group, etc.

4. There was/ is also the practice of commissioning soldiers to officer ranks because of their university education without going through any form of Officer training or command exposure. This was common with departments like intelligence, medical, finance, ISO, former PPU etc. There are the likes of Mayombo, Balya, Mugira, Bantariza etc

5. For Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs), training and promotions had been suspended for many years almost throughout the late 80s and 90s. This led to many NCOs getting stuck on the same rank for over a decade while some were holding officer responsibilities in both Command and administrative positions. Around the late 90s the ranks of WO and Staff Sgt (S/Sgt) were introduced that saw a number of some of these senior NCOs elevated. Also, a short Cadet Course (6 months) was arranged for some NCOs who fell in this category whereby they were elevated to LTs. Lucky enough even some of these NCOs who work in stores, procurement, intelligence, VIP protection, Finance etc had accumulated huge financial fortunes that they could not mind much about promotions. The best example was of now Member of Parliament LT (RTD) Saleh Kamba who remained a Sgt for over a decade but was living like a Brigadier.

6. THE MUHOOZI CLUB
When the 1st Son Muhoozi came to the scene first as a member of the Local Defence Units (LDU), recruitment for Officer Cadet took the form of selective and secret recruitment. The first batches of his trainees have since then taken over command of strategic and sensitive positions. In the same vein those officers who have ever served under the President’s protection Unit (PPU) and now SFG are given priority to take over command of the regular army units.

ACTING RANKS (AG)
Because there is no Army Establishment, Museveni created the rank of Ag i.e Ag. Col, Ag Brig, etc. He uses it where he is a bit shy to promote a junior person to a certain position and as the rest go to sleep he confirms that such person to the intended rank. For the same reasons the practice extends to acting appointments i.e Ag. Chief of Staff, Ag. Div Commander etc. The practice is also used where Museveni wishes to deny the affected officer full powers and the accruing confidence to execute his duties.

APPOINTMENTS/DEPLOYMENTS Vs KATEBE
Appointments to both command and administrative positions is supposed to match with the rank and training of the affected officer. Since promotions are done without following any established procedures it is very common to find an officer staying on the same rank for decades while others are fast tracked to higher ranks. In many cases the rank and appointment held by some officers does not match with the training and experience but is based on shear preferential treatment, sectarianism and patronage. Appointment to some sensitive positions like in intelligence, SFG, Finance, Mechanised, artillery and air defence etc, depend on Political clarity (personal loyalty to Museveni). Where appointment to top command position is made fpr someone whose political clarity is in doubt but just for purposes of hoodwinking the unsuspecting public, obviously a tested loyal cadre is deployed to deputise such officer hence rendering him ceremonial while the real power lies with the 2nd in Command. That scenario is reinforced by the emergence of Muhoozi’s SFG as the controller of all the sensitive units which are simply attached to the regular units while their command and control is retained by SFG.

POLITICAL CLARITY
It is a presumption that any soldier who is mentally and physically fit if given the necessary training, exposure, facilitation and with a sound political leadership can accomplish a given military task. The situation under Museveni’s NRA is of selective recruitment, training, deployment, promotion, exposure and logistical facilitation depending on the particular commander’s political clarity. This political clarity consideration is undermining career development, morale and performance. Appointment to command and administrative positions is seen as being more of a means of enriching or bribery while punishing those whose political clarity is in doubt. Some sensitive units now under the control of SFG have ring fenced their command and administrative positions for only those with proved political clarity. On the contrary, those whose political clarity is in doubt are rendered inactive or not deployed for long periods (katebe).

RETIREMENT
Given the situation as outlined above, it is clear that there is stampede in the rank and file of the NRA. Obviously there is disgruntlement and a lot of malcontent inside there but since it amounts to high treason to express displeasure, the affected officers simply pray for divine intervention. Museveni is reluctant to retire them for fear that they will join the opposition. He has been buying time for these aged officers to depreciate more as he strengthens his SFG under the command of his son. It is for the same reasons that he is currently deploying these officers to civilian institutions like NAADs and other poverty alleviation projects. We are yet to witness more of such officers being seconded to more other civil sectors.The situation is expected to worsen with the impending withdraw of his troops from Somalia and South Sudan unless as usual he manipulates the situation to ensure his continued survival.

CONCLUSION
museveni is now stuck with his officers whose promotion and appointments have not been following the established procedures but instead have been based on his personal interest of regime survival.

INFORMATION IS POWER

ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF UNITY/ COOPERATION FOR LIBERATION LEADERS


COMRADES

I trust that the progress in the struggle is getting clearer by the day. We all know that fighting liberation struggles is never easy but with focus and commitment, victory is ultimately attainable. So we should proceed with what we think will make the ultimate difference.

HOW TO ORGANISE AND ENHANCE UNITY/COOPERATION
I intend to cover this subject in two parts. The first one will cover the concept and the second will try to discuss the modalities of the opposition unity or cooperation, whichever is desirable at any given time. The second part will be covered in the subsequent essay.
Right from the start, it is vital to define what I mean here by opposition leaders. I wish to state that I use the term in its broadest sense possible. It transcends the usual dichotomy of the standard groups that form opposition parties to those in governments. For our purpose, it should include all other social, economic and political forces of any type that may wish a change in the status Quo.
To this end therefore, I include even some individuals or groups who may otherwise be categorised as being in government of the day. Why is this important?

THREE REASONS

1- The first is because of the nature of the current political structure in the country. Because the ruling party NRM is fused with the state, it is difficult to draw the line of who are real NRM supporters and those I consider INDIRECT CONSCRIPTS to the system. Since all the jobs are appended to the NRM party, including those in the Judiciary, parliament, civil service and even the OMBUDSMAN ( IGG) who must be a government functionary, people have lost the natural space to oppose the system. So the kind of opposition is COVERT (silent and hidden). That is why it is always a shock to Mr Museveni when he loses an election like what happened in Luweero recently. Or the many defeats he has suffered in Kampala city. To him, the easier explanation is that the opposition has stolen the vote! How can the opposition steal the vote when all the presiding officers are yours? The explanation here is simple. EVEN THOSE PRESIDING OFFICERS BELONG TO THE OPPOSITION AND SO DOES THE MAJORITY OF VOTERS. So the voting is genuine but he does not understand that his “conscripts” turn against him in the privacy of their voting booths. That is why armed thugs, in civilian clothes are now being trained so that they look into the voting booths in 2016 (the Kabalye graduates).

As said above, Mr Museveni has understood this now. And he is trying to solve it by militarising all those people who will be handling the 2016 polls. Those young people undergoing secret training in Kabalye under Gen Kayihura are to fulfil this endeavour. Museveni knows that using the formal UPDF and POLICE is going to be difficult. He can’t trust them enough either. So him and his criminal gangs are setting up AUXILIARY forces (irregular and illegal) in the name of CRIME PREVENTERS. Unlike the Kiboko Squad which was rag tag just hurriedly assembled in Central Police Station (CPS) by Kayihura, these are being set up, trained and will be armed ultimately.
To conclude this point, it is clear that the opposition is more extensive than is normally understood. It includes the majority of our people who have been made beggars but forced to wear the dirty yellow t-shirt rugs called party dress of NRM.

2- The second reason is the LEGAL FRAUD Museveni has thrived on for long. Take UPDF for instance, our constitution decrees it as a nonpartisan force. But what is it in reality? Mr Museveni has, through duplicity and brute force made it an appendage of his NRM party. But the majority of UPDF are not NRM. That is why you find a DP candidate in Entebbe Municipality winning an MP seat where the bulk of the electorate are SFC soldiers, Air Force and Marines and their wives. Why opposition politicians have been winning those seats where the UPDF soldiers make the majority. You can crosscheck these figures, but in the last election of 2011, Museveni lost in the following polling stations which were intended for the military; Mbuya, Makindye, Kasenyi (the training school for SFC) etc. This was the trend all over the country. Otherwise how would Hon Mao win in Gulu, Winnie Byanyima in Mbarara municipality, Harry Kasigwa in Jinja around barracks etc.

The situation was worse in the police. That is why Mr Museveni used to publically refer to the police force as ” an enemy” and in one address at Kololo in 2007,he declared, ” with the new commanders there, we shall not allow the police to remain an enemy detach” . This was after replacing Gen Katumba with Kayihura.

3- The third reason is that by the nature of the post-colonial African states, in many instances, there is very little difference between these political groupings. It would take a genius to decipher what makes them different than what makes them similar. After all, Africa suffered a miscarriage after independence (or is it STILLBIRTH?) As such, putting emphasis on these COMPRADOR BOURGEISIE outfits (political parties) and using their artificial categorisations would be to serve the same enemy. We must therefore reject the limitation of our space when organising our people for political action.

HOW THEN SHOULD THE “ACTIVE” OPPOSITION RELATE TO THE “SILENT” OPPOSITION (e.g., how to deal with some Museveni Ministers, commanders, ambassadors, RDCs, etc.)

My views on this subject are very clear. I prefer taking a broader strategic approach that leads to the mass involvement of our people in their own liberation. I start by recognising that the ordinary African / Ugandan has been conned and left destitute. As such, his salvation cannot depend on the same fraudulent gimmicks that has led to his current misery. This means that we must define our enemy carefully, set our means clearly and set our operational grounds carefully.
That is why, for instance, we should not concentrate on targeting some of the individual ministers of Museveni etc., who Museveni uses to avoid blame by making them appear to do all the dirty projects but actually using junior officers under them but still uses them as the fall guys. When we concentrate on the people who are wrongly defined as the CENTRE OF GRAVITY of the killer regimes, we compromise our capacity to concentrate on the real enemy. If, many of these ministers were to die any time soon, it would have no impact on the Museveni dictatorship.

As that Chinese general SUN-TZU( 544-496B.C) put it long time ago, that the job of a true warrior is to know the enemy as well as he knows himself.

That “He who knows self but not the enemy will suffer one defeat for every victory. He who knows neither self nor enemy will fail in every battle.”

So in our case, who is the real enemy? What is the centre of gravity of that dictatorship? If we are to win, where should we attack, where should we forge alliances and where should we lay in strategic wait? All of us who want victory must study all the above and make sure we understand them fully.

So it is vital to master the forms and dispositions we take as we organise. How we deploy our energies and the form we assume will determine victory or failure. For instance, why would it be me to be the one to urge comrades not to target Mr Mbabazi, Mr Kutesa, Mr Otafiire, Gen Moses Ali, Mr Moses Kigongo etc.? After all, am the one living in exile here. I would be the last person to say such! So why do I say so? Because I know that a Museveni fighting with a Mr Mbabazi is weaker, not stronger. It is just common sense really! But most important is because i understand how the enemy works and I am able to define my potential allies from current foes.

THOSE STILL WORKING WITH THE DICTATORSHIP

I want all those people still serving the Museveni dictatorship to know that they don’t need Museveni to remain alive, to survive, for their children to remain safe and happy in the new Uganda. They must know that Museveni uses them as expendables, all. And because they are not the centre of gravity of the Museveni dictatorship, they can expire any time. Just like Mr Mbabazi, Prof Bukenya etc. expired in a second. Of course these defections do not make Museveni stronger either.

But to decisively defeat the enemy, we must have the capacity to undermine the cohesion of the enemy by recruiting from his ranks. It is the Sauls that we must target and not be content with keeping the original 12! In any case, the original 12 also can reduce with a Judas branching off. We must have the capacity to attract those near him. We must have the capacity to isolate the enemy and attack his heart.

THE CORRECT WAY

So the right way to proceed would be;

First is to attack the Museveni strategy of holding on to power. We must ask ourselves, what has he used to subjugate us all this long? It cannot be by accident.

The second is to attack his alliances, who are these?
Then the third is to attack his weakened violent machinery which effectively keeps him in power (the real centre of gravity for the dictatorship) Even this must be studied carefully to isolate the individual actors from the institutions themselves. E.g. we shall note that many of the abuses are carried out by auxiliary forces under Kale Kayihura.

For instance, I know for a fact the many instances that Mr Museveni has quietly deployed against his own ministers, commanders etc. to check their perceived ambitions. I remember when one very senior minister, otherwise thought to be among the untouchables was being fought by gen Kayihura during the 2011 elections. We all knew who was behind it and what the real purpose was.

I also know how Mr Museveni would love to see the in fights in the political parties, even in NRM, the misunderstandings between e.g. Prof Bukenya and Hon Mbabazi or Otafire etc. These gentlemen need to reconcile and know that we all must reconcile and never fight Mr Museveni’s wars for him. They weaken them and strengthen him. We need to understand these things because they impact on the overall struggle.

I refuse to fight Hon Mbabazi, or Prof Bukenya, or Dr Besigye or Mr Olara Otunnu, etc. Neither am I going to waste time positioning myself for leadership after the defeat of Mr Museveni. It wastes precious time and increases infighting and intrigue. Especially when what we are fighting about (so called power) is only in our minds! How can you waste your time and energy fighting over what you don’t have? Power has been with Mr Museveni for the last 28 years. Yet the opposition keep tearing up each other for what they really do not have. The emphasis should be on how to get this power from the one abusing it. Because if you start fighting over it now, what then will you do when you really have it? By fighting on what we don’t have, we are helping the one who has it to keep! So on this one, we need to trust the people. They are capable of choosing the best leader provided they are empowered to do so. That is why this liberation process must be for their empowerment.

CONCLUSION

We therefore need to reach out to everybody. To appeal to their consciences. For them to understand they can exist without Museveni. We need to isolate Museveni the man, the one who has used the 28 uninterrupted years to build a coercive machine around himself. The Museveni system, which is nothing except himself.

To win this war of liberation, we need to appreciate that it is a new type of struggle, that we require a new approach and a new understanding of the enemy. The starting point for all the revolutionary forces is for each of us to look into the mirror and see our own weaknesses and failures, now and days past. Once we do that, then we WIN. Then we shall be able to unite all the forces that desire change.

Mr Museveni has in his government all sorts of people who were fighting him yesterday. He has long understood that accepting everyone was not only a source of strength, but an antidote against future rebellion. He has and still works with all leaders, from the leaders of FOBA to UPA,NALU, UPDM, commanders of Lakwena, Kony etc. he works with all, buys all and of course betrays most. Why then has the opposition found it difficult to understand the strength of true unity?

We need to go beyond the unhelpful dichotomy of who was wrong or right yesterday or today. We need to overcome “the self-atoning prison of our own righteousness” For each of us’s presupposed righteousness is useless if it does not bring about victory.

SOLIDARITY-
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

Gen David Sejusa
Chairman- FREE UGANDA

WHAT IS OUR EXIT STRATEGY FROM SOMALIA?


The idea of bringing back our soldiers home from Somalia is good, but how they leave Somalia should be smoothly organized and there are international treaties to examine/respect. So even if the troops were erroneously deployed to Somalia and you took over power, there would be need to institute an exit strategy, as it will be fatal to the Somali community in Mogadishu if your decree was implemented. I am sure that there are some Somali government officials who have close links with the NRM/USA governments, so abrupt withdrawal of our troops will expose those people and the remaining Burundi troops to danger.

If I would be a member of your government, I would propose that you/we alert the AU, UN, USA and the Somalis of our intention to withdraw our troops within say 3-6 months and it would be up to the AU/UN to encourage and speed up peace talks amongst the various interest groups in Somlia to draw up plans of how they will govern themselves and make sure that the Eastern African region is not threatened by their conflict.

The Somali conflict has a great impact on the Eastern African region, Africa as a whole and the international community so any decision you take about Somalia should take into consideration its implications. Already we have witnessed the piracy, terrorism, massive refugee/immigration and internal displacement of the ordinary Somalis. It is very difficult to operate as an isolated state without minding about the concerns of others and as Uganda is a signatory to many accords/pacts, Uganda can be called upon to contribute in one way or the other.

I would recommend that we follow the example of the former PM of Canada, Makienzi King who always responded to whoever asked him what he would do for example in deploying Canadian soldiers to WWII, or any national issue, ” Parliament will decide”.

Surely, Somalia poses a a big threat in the region and beyond. What is required is a comprehensive plan for the shattered country, and the major players should be the Somalis themselves with other people helping in facilitation. When we are there, I think we shall approach the Somali Question differently. There is a lot of research work done on how to broker peace in Somalia, only problem is that it seems the current players have other interests.

Regards
Simon Okurut Peter

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